Australia may no longer be ‘deputy sheriff’, but its reliance on the US has only grown deeper since 2000
- Written by: David Andrews, Senior Manager, Policy & Engagement, Australian National University
The year 2000 marked an inflection point for many Western countries, including Australia, in their outlook towards the world.
The focus began to shift away from the peacekeeping interventions that had dominated the previous decade to one shaped by counter-terrorism operations and deployments to the Middle East.
The threat of terrorism hasn’t gone away. But Australia is much more preoccupied by threats of a different nature 25 years later, largely emanating from China. These include cyber attacks, economic coercion, political interference, and the harassment of Australian Defence Force (ADF) ships, aircraft and personnel.
Though our international outlook has changed a lot over the past quarter century, Australia’s alliance with the US has remained a constant throughout.
However, as our militaries have grown closer, the US-China competition has also intensified. Combined with the array of unpredictable and destabilising decisions coming from the second Trump administration, this closeness has caused some unease in Australia.
Evolving threats and challenges
In December 2000, the Howard government released its first Defence White Paper. This marked the beginning of a period of major change in Australia’s international outlook and presence.
It emphasised that “two interrelated trends seem likely to shape our strategic environment most strongly – globalisation and US strategic primacy”. It also noted that “military operations other than conventional war [were] becoming more common.”
The paper was prescient in respect to China’s rise, as well. It said:
The United States is central to the Asia-Pacific security system […] It will be in Asia that the United States is likely to face the toughest issues in shaping its future strategic role – especially in its relationship with China.
There is a small but still significant possibility of growing and sustained confrontation between the major powers in Asia, and even of outright conflict. Australia’s interests could be deeply engaged in such a conflict, especially if it involved the United States.
Yet, nine months after that document’s release, the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, followed by the Bali bombings of 2002, began to dramatically reshape the global security outlook.
A few days after the September 11 attack, Howard invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first and only time, joinging US President George W. Bush’s “war on terror”. Australian forces then deployed to Afghanistan as part of the US-led invasion in October 2001.
By the time the 2003 Foreign Policy White Paper was released, it highlighted “terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional disorder and transnational crimes such as people smuggling” as the key features of Australia’s “more complex security environment”.
A month later, Australia joined the US-led “coalition of the willing” to invade Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein and locate and destroy stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction believed to be there. (It later emerged that evidence of the existence of these weapons was erroneous.)
Australia contributed 2,000 troops to the mission. Our soldiers remained actively engaged in training, reconstruction and rehabilitation work in Iraq until July 2009.
Both of these events tied Australia’s foreign policy interests to the US to a greater degree than any time since the Vietnam War.
Although the relationship with the US had been critical to Australian defence and foreign policy for decades, it had become less prominent in Australia’s strategic planning in the years following the end of the Cold War.
US support – and diplomatic pressure on Indonesia – had been vital in securing the post-referendum presence of Australian peacekeepers in East Timor in 1999. However, it was the “war on terror” that really re-centred the relationship as core to Australian foreign policy.
In fact, Australia was even referred to as the US’ “deputy sheriff” in the Asia-Pacific – a nickname used by Bush in 2003 that caused some unease at home and in the region.
This image has since gone on to have significant staying power, and it’s proved difficult for Australia to dislodge.
History repeating?
Though the accusations of war crimes levelled against Australian special forces in Afghanistan continue to reverberate, our foreign policy focus has shifted firmly back to our own region.
This change was driven in large part by the perceived threat posed by a rising China. While the need to focus more on China was acknowledged as early as the 2009 Defence White Paper, this emphasis became most pronounced under Scott Morrison’s leadership.
The 2024 National Defence Strategy portrayed Australia as facing “its most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War”.
It advocated for a significant change in the ADF’s strategic objectives and structure, noting the optimism of the 1990s had been “replaced by the uncertainty and tensions of entrenched and increasing strategic competition between the US and China”.
Today, the military ties between the US and Australia are arguably as close as they have ever been.
The ADF operates top-tier US platforms like the F-35 combat aircraft, P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, M1 Abrams tanks, and AH-64 Apache helicopters. Defence Minister Richard Marles has gone so far as to say the ADF should not only interoperable with the US, but interchangeable.
If all goes to plan, Australia will also build and operate its own fleet of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS partnership in the coming decades.
At the same time, US President Donald Trump’s “America First” positioning has made the US’ closest allies nervous.
His early moves have put paid to the notion that globalisation is the goal all major states are pursuing. In fact, some argue that deglobalisation may be taking hold as the US aggressively enacts tariffs against its allies, pursues economic onshoring and withdraws from key international bodies.
These actions have led to many to question whether Australia has become too dependent on its major ally and if we need to emphasise a more self-reliant defence posture. However, this is much easier said than done.
Looking back, the year 2000 represented the beginning of a period of major change for Australian foreign policy. Such is the pace of change now, we may view 2025 in the same light in another quarter century.
Whether Australia’s alliance with the US will face long-term harm is yet to be seen. No matter how the bilateral relationship may change, the Indo-Pacific region will continue to be at the core of Australia’s foreign policy outlook, much as it was at the turn of the century.
This piece is part of a series on how Australia has changed since the year 2000. You can read other pieces in the series here.
Authors: David Andrews, Senior Manager, Policy & Engagement, Australian National University
Daily Bulletin
