Can the UK prime minister make liberal democracies great again?

There’s been some “great television” this past week for those who like to watch the end of the West.

The US president and vice-president effectively sided with Russia in an attempt to bring the war in Ukraine to an end in a way that benefits a) the United States, b) the US president’s vanity, and c) Vladimir Putin.

Starmer and post-Brexit Britain

But every crisis also provides an opportunity. The UK prime minister, Keir Starmer, grasped the chance to slough off his uninspiring domestic image as he sought to keep the US engaged in negotiations and preserve a semblance of Ukrainian sovereignty.

In truth, Starmer’s diplomacy continues the policy of the previous government, which made Ukraine the crucible for Britain’s post-Brexit reintegration into European diplomacy.

Since the Russian invasion of 2022, Britain distinguished itself as one of Ukraine’s most vociferous backers. It provided strident rhetorical support alongside around £13 billion in aid since the conflict began.

Like his predecessors, Starmer’s support for Ukraine has offered respite from domestic challenges. His recent advocacy has led to a three-month high in the polls, albeit with a still dismal net approval rating of -28.

But we shouldn’t be overly cynical. His government has provided us with a framework to understand its approach. According to the doctrine of Progressive Realism, the UK government’s foreign policy reflects a “tough-minded” assessment of Britain’s position within the balance of power as it pursues enlightened ends.

The initial fit is evident: throughout his advocacy, Starmer’s continued appeals for a US backstop indicate awareness of British limitations while championing Ukrainian self-determination.

However, increasing Britain’s military budget to counter Russia at the expense of the country’s overseas aid budget is hardly progressive, as both Starmer and UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy have previously noted. Most recently, in Lammy’s case, this concerned Trump’s cuts to USAID last month.

To his credit, Starmer has recognised that Britain cannot deter Russia alone, and is assembling a “coalition of the willing”. However, even with France and smaller players such as the Scandinavians, Canadians and Australians, this may well be insufficient. Hence the ongoing appeals to the US for security guarantees that it is clearly unwilling to provide.

If we accept Einstein’s famous definition of insanity as doing the same thing and expecting different results, how should we interpret Starmer’s plans?

Continuities and change

Amid all the crisis diplomacy and commentary suggesting this might be the end of the trans-Atlantic alliance, continuity as well as change can be observed.

One of the most striking examples is the extent to which Starmer emphasises Britain’s longstanding self-perception as a “bridge” between the US and Europe. While recent turmoil has prompted Germany’s new Chancellor Friedrich Merz to declare the need for strategic independence from the US, Starmer continues to depict the US as the “indispensable” ally with whom Britain must strengthen ties.

Considered alongside Britain’s deep integration in the US’s defence and intelligence architecture, including through AUKUS – with which Trump seemed unfamiliar – it is unlikely Britain will break with America. In fact, it may even strengthen its relationship if Trump’s remarks about a UK-US trade agreement are to be believed.

For some, these structural explanations suffice when considering Britain’s commitment to the “special relationship” and its identity as the transatlantic bridge. However, psychological factors are also worth considering. Britain’s relationship with the US has been a crucial element of Britain’s pretensions to global leadership since the second world war.

The uncomfortable truth about bridges is that they get walked over, as was evident when Starmer was blindsided by the US decision to suspend military aid to Ukraine.

Europe between the US and Russia

With regard to Europe, it is another case of “plus ça change”. As in 1945, Europe again finds itself caught in the middle between Russia and the US. Critics might say the Europeans should have seen this coming.

Following the 2022 invasion, Germany, Europe’s most significant economy, proclaimed the moment as one of Zeitenwende, or a “turning point”. However, it subsequently failed to fully substantiate the claim.

Recently, President of the European Commission and former German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a “Rearm Europe Plan” that could see up to €800 billion (A$1.36 trillion) allocated to European defence. Whether this materialises remains to be seen.

France has sought to assume its traditional leading role in advocating for Europe’s strategic autonomy from the US. President Emmanuel Macron has been a prominent figure, but his plan for a partial one-month truce has garnered only lukewarm support.

However, Putin and Trump do have their admirers in Europe. What is perhaps surprising is that some of this has been too much even for the radical right to stomach – Nigel Farage, for example, leaped to Britain’s defence after Vance’s disparaging remarks. This only underscores the differences in attitudes towards Ukraine between MAGA Americans and Europeans.

Starmer has undoubtedly secured diplomatic plaudits. However, the structural forces at play suggest that his “coalition of the willing”, if it sticks to outdated ideas, will struggle to make liberal democracy great again, much as that is needed.